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Abstract: It is one of the common objectives of comparative law to make suggestions 
on how the law can be improved. In reality, however, comparative lawyers are often 
uncertain of what to conclude from their findings. For example, having examined a 
number of legal systems in detail, shall the comparatist recommend the most common 
approach, a compromise solution with a combination of legal rules, or the most well-
designed legal solution? This article suggests that comparatists may also consider that 
many other comparative disciplines, such as comparative politics, sociology and eco-
nomics, deal with questions that compare and evaluate legal differences – even if this is 
not done under the heading of comparative law (thus, here called ‘implicit comparative 
law’). Such research tends to be less hesitant in making wide-reaching legal and policy 
recommendations based on cross-country comparisons. This article critically discusses 
how such research in comparative politics, sociology and economics can help in the 
quest for ‘better law’ – but also what limitations have to be taken into account as we 
cross academic disciplines. 
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Bringing in Foreign Ideas: 
The Quest for ‘Better Law’ in Implicit Comparative Law 
 
 
 
Mathias M Siems∗ 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Comparative law can have the aim of making suggestions for law reform. Thus, the first 
meaning of the title of this article is that law-makers may bring in foreign legal ideas 
that are seen as beneficial in, for example, pursuing aims such as the advancement of 
economic development. But the title of this article also has a second meaning, namely 
that ideas may be ‘foreign’ because they originate from another discipline. This will be 
called ‘implicit’ comparative law (ICL). ICL is based on the understanding that today 
many other comparative disciplines, such as comparative politics, sociology and eco-
nomics, deal with questions that compare and evaluate legal differences. However, this 
is not done under the heading of comparative law. Thus, it is not ‘explicitly’ treated as 
research on comparative law.1 
It is suggested that ICL is particularly suitable to help comparative lawyers in 
the quest for ‘better law’. The reason for this is that those non-law comparative disci-
plines tend to be less hesitant than comparative law in making wide-reaching legal and 
policy recommendations based on cross-country comparisons. While such research has 
sometimes been criticised, it is the overall view of this article that the ‘ICL better-law 
research’ is valuable and should be incorporated into the discipline of comparative law. 
                                                 
∗
 Professor of Commercial Law, Durham University, and Research Associate, Centre for Busi-
ness Research, University of Cambridge. I thank the participants of the Workshops on ‘Interdis-
ciplinary Study and Comparative Law’ (London 7/13 and 2/14) for helpful comments. I also 
gratefully acknowledge funding from the Leverhulme Trust (Philip Leverhulme Prize 2010) for 
the underlying project on comparative law in context. 
1
 Note that ICL is different from the use of other disciplines as a conceptual tool to improve the 
method of comparative law. Further examples of ICL are discussed in Siems, M (2014) Com-
parative Law Cambridge University Press at 287-312. 
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This article is structured as follows. The next section develops a general taxon-
omy for comparative research on ‘better law’. On this basis, the subsequent three sec-
tions address the way in which ICL can contribute to this quest for better law, distin-
guishing between ‘technically improved laws’, ‘laws meeting aims more successfully’ 
and ‘laws promoting new aims’. This will be based on examples from various academic 
disciplines, although it is not the ambition of this article to present a comprehensive 
treatment of such research. The concluding section provides further reflections on the 
relationship between comparative law and other disciplines. 
 
 
2. THE QUEST FOR ‘BETTER LAW’ IN COMPARATIVE LAW 
 
Comparative lawyers frequently discuss the aims of comparative law.2 Often, one of 
those aims is to make suggestions on how the law can be improved. Explicitly, Konrad 
Zweigert and Hein Kötz suggest ‘that the comparatist is in the best position to follow 
his comparative researches with a critical evaluation’, and add that ‘(i)f he does not, no 
one else will do it’,3 Sir Basil Markesinis encourages us to ‘increase intellectual interac-
tion and borrowings’.4 Others call for ‘applied comparative law’ or ‘comparative legal 
diagnostics’.5 In this article the terminology of ‘better law’ is borrowed from a contro-
versial view in private international law.6 The apparent problem is how to decide on 
what is ‘better’. It is suggested that three broad categories, each with further sub-
categories, can be identified. 
                                                 
2
 See, eg, Glenn (2012) in Smits, JM (ed) Elgar Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law Edward 
Elgar at 65-74; Örücü, E (2007) ‘Developing Comparative Law’ in Örücü, E and Nelken, D 
(eds) Comparative Law: A Handbook Hart Publishing 43 at 53-56; Mousourakis, G (2006) Per-
spectives on Comparative Law and Jurisprudence Pearson at 7-15. 
3
 Zweigert, K and Kötz, H (1998) An Introduction to Comparative Law (3rd edn) Clarendon at 
47. 
4
 Markesinis, Sir B (2000) ‘Our Debt to Europe: Past, Present and Future’ in Markesinis, Sir B 
(ed) The Coming Together of the Common Law and the Civil Law Hart Publishing 37 at 49. 
5
 Finnegan, DL 2006 ‘Applied Comparative Law and Judicial Reform’ (8) Thomas M Cooley 
Journal of Practical and Clinical Law 97; Bellantuono, G (2012) ‘Comparative Legal Di-
agnostics’, Working Paper, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2000608. 
6
 Leflar, RA et al (1986) American Conflicts Law (4th edn) Michie Co § 95 at 279. For criticism 
see, eg, Tetley, W (1994) International Conflict of Laws: Common, Civil and Maritime Les Édi-
tions Yvon Blais at 14 -15, 447. 
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First, comparative law may help to improve law ‘technically’. This refers to the 
situation when, in particular circumstances, in two or more jurisdictions the law leads to 
a similar result. Such a view is typical for a functional-technical perspective of com-
parative law, in particular if it assumes a presumption of similar results (praesumptio 
similitudinis).7 There can be different reasons why in such a situation a jurisdiction may 
regard a foreign law as ‘better’. It could be that this law provides more legal certainty, ie 
clearer legal rules and concepts, for instance, through codification. But it might also be 
the case that the foreign law is better able to balance different interests, if, for example, 
it employs general principles, with the details being left to the judiciary. In addition, 
such an approach may have the advantage that it is more adaptable to possible future 
developments. Finally, it may be advantageous to have legal rules which are close to the 
‘international mainstream’. The rationale may be that it can reduce the costs which arise 
from differences between legal systems. Another potential benefit is that moving to-
wards the mainstream has the strategic aim of showing that a country wants to modern-
ise its law, even if the actual results do not change much. 
Second, the benefit may be that the ‘better’ law meets a particular aim or aims 
more successfully. This is based on – what can be called – ‘socio-legal functionalism’, 
meaning the view that the purpose of a particular item of law is to address a particular 
problem or to pursue a particular policy. It can also be related to utilitarian perspectives 
which suggest that there is a certain aim, such as the maximisation of happiness, which 
the law should pursue.8 The most intuitive case is that the transplanted institution may 
achieve the aim more fully. For example, a foreign rule may be better able to address a 
social problem. The decisive change may also be the provision of new institutional 
structures, such as better judicial enforcement. Alternatively, it is possible to compare 
the domestic with the foreign model in terms of costs and benefits. Thus, here, it would 
be considered that a foreign model might be more effective but also more costly, and 
that there may be switching costs when a country adopts a foreign model. Another vari-
ant of this category is to be concerned about the belief of the local population that a par-
                                                 
7
 For this presumption see Zweigert and Kötz supra n 3 at 40. 
8
 For the utilitarian case for legal transplants see Bentham, J (1843) ‘Essay on the Influence of 
Time and Place in Matters of Legislation’ in Bowring, J (ed.), The Works of Jeremy Bentham 
William Tait vol. 1 at 169. See also Huxley, A (2007) ‘Jeremy Bentham on Legal Transplants’ 
(2) Journal of Comparative Law 177. 
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ticular aim is fulfilled. Thus, even a ‘legal placebo’9 may be ‘better’, for example, if the 
general public wrongly believes that a foreign model of criminal law is more effective 
in preventing crime. 
Third, the improvement may be that a foreign model triggers changes that pur-
sue new aims, such as introducing a new social or economic policy or a re-balancing of 
group interests. This would be based on the socio-legal evolutionary view that the mod-
ernisation of societies and the modernisation of law go hand in hand. The main case is 
therefore that changes to legal rules have the aim to change society in a particular way.10 
These changes may be geared towards new economic goals, but it can also be the case 
that the experience of other countries challenges the domestic law on ethical grounds.11 
It is also possible that the society has already changed. Thus, here, identifying ‘better 
law’ means that the foreign law better responds to those changed societal circum-
stances.12 Another variant is that the foreign law does not ‘fit’; however, it is seen as 
useful to follow, because it can be given a new meaning which is beneficial for the latter 
country. For example, such a situation may occur in constitutional law, because consti-
tutions have different functions in different political environments.13 
                                                 
9
 Aviram, A (2006) ‘The Placebo Effect of Law: Law’s Role in Manipulating Perceptions’ (75) 
George Washington Law Review 54. 
10
 Cf. also Nelken, D (2003) ‘Comparatists and Transferability’ in Legrand, P and Munday, R 
(eds) Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions Cambridge University Press 437 at 
456 (on legal transplants ‘geared to fitting an imagined future’); Pirie, F (2013) The Anthropol-
ogy of Law Oxford University Press at 183, 227 (legal borrowing often aspiration to participate 
in ‘civilized and sophisticated traditions’). 
11
 For a controversial example see Glendon, MA (1987) Abortion and Divorce in Western Law: 
American Failures, European Challenges Harvard University Press. See also Glendon, MA; 
Carozza, PG and Picker, CB (2008) Comparative Legal Traditions in a Nutshell (3rd edn) West 
at 8 (‘power and duty to make a critical evaluation what he or she discovers through compari-
son’). 
12
 Eörsi, G (1979) Comparative Civil (Private) Law Akademiai Kiado at 564 (suggesting the 
term ‘adaptational reception’). 
13
 See text accompanying note 104 below. 
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Table 1: Taxonomy of ‘Better Law Comparisons’ 
Main  
categories 
Underlying 
view of com-
parative law 
Common criticism What implicit comparative 
law (ICL) can offer 
Technically 
improved law 
 
Technical func-
tionalism; pre-
sumption of 
similarity 
Legal systems re-
flect unique cul-
tures 
Are these differences really 
only ‘technical’ ones or do 
they play a role for sub-
stantive aims? 
Law meeting a 
particular 
aim(s) more 
successfully 
Socio-legal 
functionalism; 
utilitarianism 
Law cannot be as-
sumed to have a 
clear pre-deter-
mined causal effect 
Do empirics show that par-
ticular rules ‘work’ better, 
and what is the role of law 
enforcement? 
Law promot-
ing new aim(s) 
Socio-legal evo-
lutionary ap-
proach 
Patronising to as-
sume that some le-
gal systems are less 
advanced 
What aims are available, 
and does experience show 
that one of them is prefer-
able? 
 
Table 1 summarises this taxonomy. In addition, it indicates some of the criticism di-
rected at ‘better law comparisons’. Here, first, culture and difference play a prominent 
role. For example, the ‘cultural constraints argument’ argues that differences between 
legal systems are ‘unbridgeable’ since laws are embedded in ‘unique national cul-
tures’.14 We are also told to ‘celebrate plurality’ and to reject the view of law as an in-
strument of solving problems.15 Second, it is not seen as a task of comparative law to 
tell us which solutions work ‘better’ to meet a particular aim, but, rather, the aim is to 
get a better understanding of the world. This also relates to the view that legal rules are 
deeply embedded in their historical, social, cultural and economic context, preventing 
valid cross-cultural statements about the quality of legal rules.16 Thus, it is regarded as 
                                                 
14
 Antokolskaia, M (2007) ‘Comparative Family Law: Moving with the Times?’ in Örücü and 
Nelken supra n 2, 241 at 256 (for family law). See also Grossfeld, B (1990) Strength and Weak-
nesses of Comparative Law Clarendon at 41 (uniqueness of legal systems); Legrand, P (1998) 
‘Are Civilians Educatable?’ (18) Legal Studies 216 at 225, 229 (differences seen as matter of 
‘national and cultural identity’). 
15
 See McCrudden, C (2007) ‘Judicial Comparativism and Human Rights’ in Örücü and Nelken 
supra n 2, 371 at 373-4; Menski, W (2006) Comparative Law in a Global Context (2nd edn) 
Cambridge University Press at 11. 
16
 De Cruz, P de (2007) Comparative Law in a Changing World (3rd edn) Routledge Cavendish 
at 224 (‘the comparatist is not seeking to be judgmental about legal systems in the sense of 
whether he believes them to be “better” or “worse” than any other given system’); Legrand, P 
(2006) ‘Comparative Legal Studies and the Matter of Authenticity’ (1) Journal of Comparative 
Law 371 at 448 (‘(t)here cannot be a “better” law. The very notion is fallacious. Who could fi-
nally and definitively say what it is?’). 
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impossible to say that laws have a clear pre-determined causal effect. The third line of 
criticism is that claims about ‘better law’ are often patronising towards allegedly less 
developed societies. For example, the imposition of human rights on non-Western coun-
tries is sometimes seen as a ‘neo-imperial’ endeavour in promoting property rights that 
mainly benefit international companies and investors.17 And more generally the recep-
tion of a foreign law may even be compared to ‘the extinction of animal and plant spe-
cies that results from the destruction of natural habitat’.18 
Thus, it seems that this internal debate among comparative lawyers about ‘better 
law comparisons’ has reached something of a dead end. The remainder of this article 
will therefore turn to other comparative disciplines (ie, ICL, see 1 above) in order to 
broaden and deepen our ability to assess legal models from different countries. As Table 
1 indicates, this article suggests that ICL may be able to provide answers to a number of 
core questions of ‘better-law comparisons’. This will be elaborated in the following sec-
tions. 
 
 
3. ICL ON TECHNICALLY IMPROVED LAW 
 
Recommendations for the technical improvement of law may be thought to lie primarily 
in the domain of comparative (and non-comparative) lawyers. However, ICL also has 
something to say about this topic. In particular, it can raise the question of whether such 
differences do not also play a substantive role, as the following two examples aim to 
illustrate. 
First, a major topic of the ‘technical’ nature of law is whether it is preferable to 
have detailed statute law or more general principles, based, say, on case law. The view 
favouring statute law can be traced to Max Weber. Weber developed a typology of so-
cio-legal systems, distinguishing between two dimensions: on the one hand formal and 
                                                 
17
 Mattei, U and Nader, L (2008) Plunder: When the Rule of Law is Illegal Wiley-Blackwell at 
153; Obiora, LA (1998) ‘Toward an Auspicious Reconciliation of International and Compara-
tive Analyses’ (46) American Journal of Comparative Law 669 at 673-4. 
18
 Hyland, R (1996) ‘Comparative Law’ in Patterson, D (ed), A Companion to Philosophy of 
Law and Legal Theory Wiley-Blackwell 184 at 193. See also de Sousa Santos, B (2004) Toward 
a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization, and Emancipation (2nd edn) Butterworths at 
192.  
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substantive (or informal), and on the other hand rational and irrational.19 It was seen as 
damaging if a society was based on irrationality, be it formal (eg, using oracles) or in-
formal (eg, deciding conflicts in an arbitrary way). With respect to rational regimes, 
Weber preferred the formality of rules to the informality of principles, values and tradi-
tions. These ‘ideal types’ were seen as related to different countries and regions: irra-
tionality was associated with Asian and African cultures, for example, referring to Con-
fucian ethics in China and the ‘Khadi justice’ of Islamic law. Informal rationality was 
associated with England, and formal rationality was seen as typical for the modern Ro-
man-based codes of continental Europe which was then also associated with a success-
ful capitalist economy. 
Weber’s view has been criticised for its dismissive treatment of non-Western 
laws,20 but in the present context it is mainly of interest that other researchers regard 
case law as preferable. For example, law and economics scholars often claim that case 
law is more efficient than statute law, because it enables a decentralised, bottom-up 
construction of the legal order.21 The argument is that, while civil and common law may 
often reach similar results, in the long run the case-law style of the common law leads to 
a legal system that is more adaptable than the civil law.  
Economists have also tried to identify how such criteria could be measured. For 
example, Thorsten Beck and colleagues used three proxies for a variable on legal adapt-
ability: ‘complaint must be legally justified, judgment must be legally justified, and 
judgment must be on law (not on equity)’.22 The result was that the law seemed to be 
more adaptable in common than in civil law countries. Yet, there are some problems 
with this line of reasoning. The extent of legal adaptability is not just dependent on the 
                                                 
19
 The main work is Weber, M (1978) [1922] Economy and Society University of California 
Press. This summary is based on Siems, supra n 1 at 303. 
20
 Eg, Qian, XY (2010) ‘Traditional Chinese law v Weberian legal rationality’ (10) Max Weber 
Studies 29; Nader, L (2009) ‘Law and the Frontiers of Illegalities’ in von Benda-Beckmann, F, 
von Benda-Beckmann, K and Griffiths, A (eds), The Power of Law in a Transnational World. 
Anthropological Enquiries Berghahn Books 54 at 62. 
21
 See, eg, Zywicki, TJ and Stringham, EP (2011) ‘Common Law and Economic Efficiency’ in 
Parisi, F (ed), Production of Legal Rules Edward Elgar 107; Mahoney, PG (2001) ‘The Com-
mon Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might be Right’ (30) Journal of Legal Studies 503. 
22
 Beck, T; Demirguc-Kunt, A and Levine, R (2003) ‘Law and Finance. Why Does Legal Origin 
Matter?’ (31) Journal of Comparative Economics 653 at 664 with data from Djankov, S, La 
Porta, R, Lopez-de-Silanes, F and Shleifer, A (2003) ‘Courts’ (118) Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 453 at 465. 
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role of courts. A more meaningful catalogue also needs to take into account the legisla-
ture, the lawyers and the general public of a particular place. If this is done, the situation 
is more ambiguous as to which legal family has an advantage in terms of adaptability.23 
Moreover, adaptability has to be balanced with legal certainty. This leads us back to 
Weber’s reasoning and, in the current context, it has indeed been argued that civil law 
countries have an advantage in terms of legal certainty.24 
Second, even when the actual results are similar, one may well wonder whether 
it matters if the legal rules of a particular country are close to the international main-
stream. Here, the argument in favour of uniform rules is that it can decrease the transac-
tion costs arising from differences between legal systems.25 The opposing view is that 
there is a benefit in diversity as it stimulates regulatory competition for better laws, ie a 
‘race to the top’.26  
These topics have also attracted a good deal of research in economics and re-
lated disciplines. Some of it uses theoretical models in order to understand the costs and 
benefits of harmonisation and regulatory competition.27 There has also been empirical 
research, for example, on the functioning and role of both of these themes in the US and 
its states, Canada and its provinces, and the EU and its Member States.28 But this re-
search has not led to unambiguous results. Lawyers often point out that the legal pre-
conditions for harmonisation and regulatory competition play a decisive role, for exam-
                                                 
23
 Siems, M (2006) ‘Legal Adaptability in Elbonia’ (2) International Journal of Law in Context 
393. 
24
 See www.fondation-droitcontinental.org/jcms/c_12115/index-de-la-securite-juridique and 
Raynouard, A and Kerhuel, A-J (2011) ‘Measuring the Law: Sécurité Juridique as a Watermark’ 
(8) International Journal of Disclosure and Governance 360. 
25
 Cf, eg, Mattei, U (1997) Comparative Law and Economics University of Michigan Press at 
94, 219; Pistor, K (2002) ‘The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing Economies’ 
(50) American Journal of Comparative Law 97. 
26
 The distinction between ‘race to the bottom’ and ‘race to the top’ is from Cary, WL (1974) 
‘Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware’ (83) Yale Law Journal 663.  
27
 Eg, Crettez B; Deffains B and Musy O (2013) ‘On Legal Cooperation and the Dynamics of 
Legal Convergence’ (156) Public Choice 345; Carbonara, E and Parisi, F (2007) ‘The Paradox 
of Legal Harmonization’ (132) Public Choice 367; Van den Bergh, R (2000) ‘Towards an Insti-
tutional Legal Framework for Regulatory Competition in Europe’ (53) Kyklos 435.  
28
 Eg, in company law: Romano, R (1993) The Genius of American Corporate Law AEI Press; 
Cumming, D and MacIntosh, JG (2000) ‘The Role of Interjurisdictional Competition in Shaping 
Canadian Corporate Law’ (20) International Review of Law and Economics 141; Becht, M; 
Mayer, C and Wagner, HF (2008) ‘Where do Firms Incorporate? Deregulation and the Cost of 
Entry’ (14) Journal of Corporate Finance 241. 
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ple, the rules on private international law. Economists, by contrast, tend to focus on 
other themes, for example, the role of information and switching costs, the incentives of 
both law-makers and users, and the relevance of path dependencies.29 
Thus, overall, ICL does not provide a clear answer about the right level of stat-
ute law and harmonisation. Yet, in both instances, it manages to show that those differ-
ences are not only of a technical nature. Thus, here already, we can see that comparative 
law can benefit from research in other disciplines. Even more so, this is the case for the 
topics of the following two categories.  
 
 
4. ICL ON LAW WHICH MEETS AIMS MORE SUCCESSFULLY 
 
The present section discusses whether comparative experience may be used to pursue a 
particular aim or aims more successfully. Unlike the discussion in the subsequent sec-
tion, where comparative insights are used to promote new aims, it is assumed that this 
aim is not controversial. To be sure, this conceptual division is not always clear-cut. It 
can depend on the level of generality of whether aims are uncontroversial. For example, 
general aims such as promoting economic growth or maximising the happiness of all 
may be uncontroversial for the jurisdictions of a particular study. However, as law-
makers pursue more precise aims, it may then be controversial whether, say, growth in 
production or growth in financial markets is the jurisdictions’ main economic aim.  
It is suggested that ICL is particularly helpful in analysing the effect of the law 
from a comparative perspective, because in many non-law disciplines empirical data are 
more widely analysed than in legal research. The present section explains this research 
in three steps, while also addressing the difficulty of establishing clear causal relation-
ships. 
 
4.1 Foreign Experience on the Effects of Particular Legal Rules 
 
Economists and other social scientists have conducted many quantitative comparative 
studies in order to establish which types of legal rules are ‘best’ — most conducive for 
                                                 
29
 See, eg, the research cited in the previous two footnotes. 
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financial development, for example. A well-known study by Rafael La Porta and col-
leagues coded the law on shareholder protection (as well as creditor protection) across 
49 countries.30 The strength of shareholder protection was based on an aggregate of six 
variables defined in a binary way. For instance, the variable on ‘proxy by mail allowed’ 
was said to ‘equal[s] one if the company law or commercial code allows shareholders to 
mail the proxy vote to the firm, and zero otherwise.’ La Porta et al then drew on these 
numbers as independent variables for statistical regressions, finding that good share-
holder protection leads to more dispersed shareholder ownership, which can be seen as 
an indicator for developed capital markets. They also grouped the 49 countries into ‘le-
gal origins’ (ie, legal families), with the result that common-law countries had the rela-
tively strongest and French civil-law countries the weakest legal protection of share-
holders. 
Subsequent papers by those scholars (though with modifications in co-
authorship) have used a similar method for other areas of law such as civil procedure, 
securities regulation and labour law.31 The World Bank has also incorporated some of 
the ‘La Porta studies’ into its Doing Business Reports, annually published since 2004.32 
Other organisations and groups of scholars have also conducted empirical research on 
the effect of legal rules. From as early as the 1990s the OECD developed indicators of 
employment protection.33 These indicators have inspired academic research on estab-
lishing a link between employment law and the role of firm-specific, industry-specific 
and general skills.34 In company law and related fields a project on Law, Finance and 
                                                 
30
 La Porta, R; Lopez-de-Silanes, F; Shleifer, A and Vishny, R (1998) ‘Law and Finance’ (106) 
Journal of Political Economy 1113. See also Djankov, S: La Porta, R; Lopez-de-Silanes, F and 
Shleifer, A (2008) ‘The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing’ (88) Journal of Financial 
Economics 430 (acknowledging some of the previous shortcomings). See also the contributions 
of Dionysia Katelouzou, Jaakko Husa and Gary Watt in this volume. 
31
 Djankov et al supra n 22; La Porta; R, Lopez-de-Silanes, F and Shleifer, A (2006) ‘What 
Matters in Securities Laws’ (61) Journal of Finance 1; Botero, J; Djankov, S; La Porta, R; 
Lopez-de-Silanes, F and Shleifer, A (2004) ‘The Regulation of Labor’ (119) Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 1340. 
32
 See www.doingbusiness.org. The Doing Business Report also employs some socio-legal data, 
eg, on courts (see also the subsequent section of this article). 
33
 OECD Indicators of Employment Protection (current version from 2013), available at 
www.oecd.org/employment/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm. 
34
 Estevez-Abe, M; Iversen, T and Soskice, D (2001) ‘Social Protection and the Formation of 
Skills: A Reinterpretation of the Welfare State’ in Hall, PA and Soskice, D (eds), Varieties of 
Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage Oxford University Press 
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Development, based at the University of Cambridge, conducted a more refined study of 
legal rules than the La Porta studies. However, the claim that the quality of the law is 
reflected in a country’s financial development was only confirmed in some cases.35 An-
other study conducted at the University of Bremen examined the conveyancing services 
market in the EU. This study managed to show that a higher degree of regulation has a 
negative effect on the choice, quality, certainty and speed of conveyancing services.36 
This research about the causal effect of law has been highly influential, but also 
controversial. Some of the criticism relates to the construction of legal indices, the cod-
ing of legal rules and the aggregation of legal data. Often this line of criticism is related 
to specific studies. For example, La Porta et al’s quantification of shareholder protection 
is frequently seen as flawed.37 There is also a more general problem of reducing the 
high complexity of the strength of shareholder protection (or other legal topics) across 
countries to mere numbers.38 But this does not mean that such attempts cannot be made, 
as the experience of other disciplines shows that it is not impossible to quantify infor-
mation on highly complex topics such as pollution levels, economic growth or intelli-
gence. 
A further contentious issue is whether it is possible to say that there is a clear 
link between law and financial development. Some empirical scholarship has suggested 
that other aspects such as politics, culture and capital account liberalisation are more 
important for financial development than legal rules.39 There is also the problem that, if 
                                                                                                                                               
145. 
35
 Summary in Siems, M and Deakin, S (2010) ‘Comparative Law and Finance: Past, Present 
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Journal of Corporate Law Studies 17. 
38
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Order to Reduce Complexity’ (13) Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law 521. 
39
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Roots in the Severity of Economic Inequality’ (39) Journal of Comparative Economics 279; 
Stulz, RM and Williamson, R (2003) ‘Culture, Openness, and Finance’ (70) Journal of 
Financial Economcis 313; Chinn, MD and Ito, H (2006) ‘What Matters for Financial 
Development? Capital Controls, Institutions, and Interactions’ (81) Journal of Development 
Economics 163. 
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there is causality, it can go the other way.40 For instance, there are examples which 
show that it was only after the number of investors and the importance of the capital 
market was increased that shareholder protection was strengthened.41 Yet, there are also 
ways to address this problem. For example, as far as time series data are available, it can 
be possible to identify the direction of causality. 
In the present context, the main challenge is whether data showing that a particu-
lar model works ‘best’ really tells us that this model should be adopted. In reaction to 
the World Bank’s Doing Business Report, a French group criticised the doing-business 
focus of the report, taking the view that law should aim ‘to protect social peace and the 
citizens’ freedom and will’.42 Thus, the argument is that claiming to measure what 
works ‘best’ is only meaningful as far as countries follow the same aim. Apart from ba-
sic human needs, this is unlikely to be the case for a study that examines all countries of 
the world. 
Insofar as countries do pursue the same aim, it is also not clear whether follow-
ing the most successful model is always advisable. The research cited above is only able 
to show that, overall, a particular model works better than others. But in an individual 
case it may, given the association between legal rules and the social, economic and cul-
tural context of the law, work quite differently than intended.43 Thus, while such re-
search can be a useful guidance, the apparent advantage of a foreign model should not 
be seen as providing law-makers with a blueprint that should simply be adopted without 
further reflections. 
                                                 
40
 See generally Chong, A and Calderon, C (2000) ‘Causality and Feedback Between Institu-
tional Measures and Economic Growth’ (12) Economics and Politics 69 (multiple causal rela-
tionship with various feedback mechanisms); Aoki, M (2001) Toward a Comparative Institu-
tional Analysis MIT Press at 6 (‘institutions should be viewed as co-evolving with economic-
demographic dynamics rather than determining economic demographic variables in a uni-
directional way’). 
41
 Cheffins, BR (2001) ‘Does Law Matter? The Separation of Ownership and Control in the 
United Kingdom’ (30) Journal of Legal Studies 459. See also Cheffins, BR (2008) Corporate 
Ownership and Control: British Business Transformed Oxford University Press (exploring what 
actually led to dispersed shareholder ownership in the UK). 
42
 Fauvarque-Cosson, B and Kerhuel, A-J (2009) ‘Is Law an Economic Contest? French Reac-
tions to the Dong Business World Bank Reports and Economic Analysis of Law’ (57) American 
Journal of Comparative Law 811 at 822 (referring to the reaction by the Association Henri 
Capitant des Amis de La Culture Juridique Française). 
43
 For the different views about the relationship between law and society see Siems supra n 1 at 
121-4. 
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4.2 Learning How Rules Can Be Better Enforced 
 
Meeting common aims more successfully can also be achieved by improving the en-
forcement of the law. This refers not just to the role of courts but also to administrative 
bodies and other institutions. Apart from comparative legal research, other comparative 
disciplines have taken an interest in these topics. In particular, comparative politics has 
become more and more interested in the way state institutions work, including a shift 
from emphasising universal relationships to an emphasis on the role of context.44 
Sometimes it is possible to identify a common general aim which countries pur-
sue in the design of such institutions. For example, comparative research on administra-
tive practices often starts with the problem that rulers may be tempted to appoint 
friends, family members and political allies to positions of power. Thus, research in po-
litical science attempts to develop categories that can be used to compare the profes-
sionalism and effectiveness of bureaucracies.45 One also needs to consider, though, that 
this ‘Weberian’ aim for a professional and politically neutral civil service may be sup-
plemented (or substituted) by other aims. For instance, researchers today often distin-
guish bureaucracies which implement pre-defined programmes from those that aim for 
client satisfaction, consumer participation, conflict resolution and cost-effective re-
sults.46 
Similar problems arise if one wishes to identify ‘the best’ courts with quantita-
tive cross-country data. However, such an evaluation is often attempted, and the World 
Bank even claims that ‘(m)easuring the performance of the various elements of the jus-
                                                 
44
 See March, JG and Olsen, JP (2006) ‘Elaborating the “New Institutionalism”’ in Rhodes, 
RAW, Binder, SA and Rockman, BA (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions Ox-
ford University Press 3; Mair, P (1996) ‘Comparative Politics: An Overview’ in Gooden, R and 
Klingemann, H-D (eds) A New Handbook of Political Science Oxford University Press 309 at 
315, 328. 
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 Discussion of possible criteria in Fukuyama, F (2013) ‘What Is Governance?’ (26) Govern-
ance 347. 
46
 See Adler, M and Stendahl, S (2012) ‘Administrative Law, Agencies and Redress Mecha-
nisms in the United Kingdom and Sweden’ in Clark, DS (ed) Comparative Law and Society 
Edward Elgar 254 at 257. 
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tice sector is crucial for any justice reform’.47 For example, reports by the World Bank48 
have incorporated two studies by Simeon Djankov and colleagues. These studies deal 
with the efficiency of courts and the regulation of entry of start-up firms across 109 and 
85 countries respectively, in particular the speed of proceedings. In the article on courts 
this relates to the duration of trial and enforcement for hypothetical cases to evict a ten-
ant for non-payment of rent and to collect a bounced cheque, and in the article on regu-
lation of entry they examine the number of procedures, official time, and official cost 
that a start-up must bear before it can operate legally. Finally, the view is taken that in 
both instances lengthy proceedings are harmful to the ease of doing business.49 
While the length of proceedings cannot be the only ‘benchmark’ that matters for 
the assessment of courts, it seems plausible that overly lengthy proceedings are harmful 
since they make the substantive rights underlying these proceedings obsolete. The prob-
lem is, though, that these substantive rights are often very diverse across countries. For 
example, the Djankov et al study, which uses court proceedings to evict a tenant as a 
starting point, is unsatisfactory because some countries have special laws to protect ten-
ants. Such general comparisons of courts can, therefore, only be a valid basis for policy 
recommendations if they are limited to countries that have a comparable social structure 
and comparable substantive law on a particular issue. 
Empirical research can also be revealing for the strength of other more specific 
enforcement institutions. For example, Howell Jackson and Mark Roe have challenged 
the view that it is good private enforcement of investor protection, but not good public 
enforcement, which stimulates financial market development.50 For this purpose, re-
source-based enforcement data, such as the staffing of securities commissions per popu-
lation and its budget per GDP, were used as indicators for the strength of public en-
forcement. The authors found that public enforcement is more important than private 
                                                 
47
 See http://go.worldbank.org/LRFA0Q06E1; ie the purpose is to improve these institutions, 
thus, developing ‘benchmarks’ or ‘indicators’; see Davis, KE, Kingsbury, B and Merry, SE 
(2012) ‘Indicators as a Technology of Global Governance’ (46) Law and Society Review 71. 
48
 World Development Report (2002) Building Institutions for Markets Oxford University Press 
at 117-132 (for the courts study) and the Doing Business Reports (see note 32 above). 
49
 Djankov et al supra n 22; Djankov, S; La Porta, R; Lopez-de-Silanes, F and Shleifer, A (2002) 
‘The Regulation of Entry’ (117) Quarterly Journal of Economics 1. 
50
 This relates to La Porta et al supra n 31. 
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liability rules, and about as important as disclosure rules, in explaining financial out-
comes.51 
The Jackson and Roe study was based on the plausible assumption that securi-
ties commissions have similar tasks, such as enforcing laws against insider dealing, se-
curities fraud, financial disclosure violations and so on. However, it may be problematic 
to rely solely on ‘input measures’ such as staffing and budget. In the analysis of institu-
tions, political scientists and economists often distinguish between input and output 
measures.52 Neither of these measures are perfect. For example, input measures are not 
meaningful if good financial resources are wasted, and output measures are not mean-
ingful if a particular jurisdiction happens to have more (or less) violations of the law 
than others due to external circumstances. Thus, it seems advisable to consider both sets 
of measures before making policy recommendations based on a foreign enforcement 
model. 
 
4.3 Complicating the Assessment: Costs and Perceptions 
 
Up to this point, it has been assumed in this section that it ‘only’ matters whether a par-
ticular law is better able to pursue a particular aim. But this is not the full picture. First, 
it seems likely that countries do not just want to assess the benefits of foreign models. 
They also want to assess their costs. These may be ‘switching costs’, but they may also 
be permanent ones such as the side effects of substantive rules, or increased funding for 
improved enforcement institutions. Disciplines which are more quantitative than law 
can make an important contribution in assessing these costs and benefits. 
Take the simple example of a stolen asset bought by a bona-fide purchaser. 
Some jurisdictions, such as England and Wales, tend to protect the original owner of the 
stolen asset, whereas others, such as France, tend to protect the bona fide purchaser. As-
suming economic efficiency as a common aim, we have to compare the costs generated 
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 Jackson, HE and Roe, MJ (2009) ‘Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: 
Resource-Based Evidence’ (93) Journal of Financial Economics 207. 
52
 See, eg, Fukuyama supra n 45 at 355-6. 
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by taking care of the asset with the costs for investigations of the ownership of the title. 
This can enable us to say whether the French or the English solution is preferable.53 
Second, instead of relying on objective data, law-makers may consider the way 
in which the population subjectively perceives how well a particular aim is fulfilled. 
Comparative survey methods are frequently used in the social sciences, and they are al-
so an important tool for governments and other policy actors.54 Some global surveys of 
this type provide interesting opportunities for further analysis. One such survey was 
conducted by Maksym Ivanyna and Anwar Shah, who constructed a ‘citizen-centric 
governance index’ based on data from the World Value Survey.55 In another such sur-
vey, Bruno Deffains and Ludivine Roussey found that the level of trust in judicial insti-
tutions, as measured by the same survey, positively depends on public resources de-
voted to the judiciary.56 
The problem with comparative survey data is, however, that the answers may 
not be fully comparable across countries. There is the apparent risk that participants un-
derstand broad terms such as ‘trust in the judiciary’ in a dissimilar way, in particular 
when questions are drafted in different languages.57 It is also said that participants are 
typically coloured by cultural differences and recent economic performance.58 More-
over, participants may have their own agenda. For example, a ‘loyal citizen could try to 
make his country look better than it really is, whereas a political activist striving for im-
provement might try to make his or her country look worse than it really is’.59 
                                                 
53
 See Ogus, A (2006) Costs and Cautionary Tales: Economic Insights for the Law Hart Pub-
lishing at 45-7 (suggesting that the French solution is preferable since it is more expensive to 
investigate a foreign title than to take care of one’s own assets). 
54
 References in Hantrais, L (2009) International Comparative Research: theory, methods and 
practice Palgrave Macmillan and St Martin’s Press at 17, 26, 49, 130. 
55
 Ivanyna, M and Shah, A (2011) ‘Citizen-centric Governance Indicators: Measuring and Moni-
toring Governance By Listening to the People’, (12) CESifo Forum 59. For the World Value 
Survey see www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSData.jsp.  
56
 Deffains, B and Roussey, L (2012) ‘Confidence in Judicial Institutions: An Empirical Ap-
proach’ (8) Journal of Institutional Economics 351.  
57
 See Hantrais supra n 54 at 78-81. 
58
 Kurtz, MJ and Schrank, A (2007) ‘Growth and Governance: Models, Measures, and 
Mechanisms’ (69) The Journal of Politics 538; Hantrais supra n 54 at 82-3. 
59
 Feld, LP and Voigt, S (2003) ‘Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross-country  
Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators’ (19) European Journal of Political Economy 497 at 
505. 
 18 
Thus, it is doubtful whether law-makers should rely solely on survey data to 
compare the suitability of legal rules and institutions. However, such data may still be 
one of several useful sources of information, given that different methods of data collec-
tion all have their advantages and disadvantages. Scholars and policy makers have also 
developed combined indicators,60 though those may raise problems of aggregation if the 
results are sensitive to small changes.61 
 
 
5. ICL ON LAW WHICH PROMOTES NEW AIMS 
 
Since different jurisdictions pursue different aims, comparative lawyers are often not 
sure whether or how it can be said that the law of one jurisdiction is ‘better’ than the 
law of another jurisdiction. Other social sciences may acknowledge the same problem, 
but there is also a greater willingness to evaluate whether one of these aims is prefer-
able. This section discusses three fields where this has been attempted. They relate to 
the: law of developing countries; models of capitalism and welfare law; and constitu-
tional law. These are topics that, traditionally, have not been the core focus of compara-
tive lawyers. Thus, it is suggested that ICL may be able to fill this gap, at least as far as 
it can present different policy options. 
 
5.1 Economic Development, Human Development and Happiness 
 
Today, a dominant narrative advises that law should aim to promote economic devel-
opment. Economists in particular have shaped the current debate. For example, the Pe-
ruvian economist Hernando de Soto claims that economic development depends on the 
formal protection of property, because informality tends to foster corruption and ineffi-
                                                 
60
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ciencies.62 Books by Kenneth Dam, Bob Cooter & Hans-Bernd Schäfer and Niall Fer-
guson also refer to the need for secure property rights, rules protecting investors and an 
effective judicial system if economic development is to take place.63 Moreover, empiri-
cal work is said to have confirmed that those and related reasons ‘matter’, in particular 
‘institutions’, ‘governance’ and the ‘rule of law’.64 
However, a number of counter-arguments can be suggested. First, it is unrealis-
tic to assume that there is only a unidirectional relationship between legal and non-legal 
factors.65 In particular, it is also possible that the society has already changed and that 
law is catching up with these developments.66 In the current context this is particularly 
relevant for the phenomenon of ‘localised globalism’, namely where local patterns 
change due to the impact of transnational imperatives, for example, if law-makers feel 
that they have to respond to the growing influence of multinational corporations.67 
Second, this view has been heavily criticised as far as it appears to suggest a 
blueprint for all countries of the world. The main objection is that this promotes a West-
ern model that may not be suitable elsewhere. This line of criticism can refer to the legal 
context: for example, it may be said that there are ‘different popular ideas in different 
countries about the purposes of law and what is to be expected from it’,68 and that ‘pre-
packed reforms’ tend to pay no attention to the way new and old law, including its legal 
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culture and institutions, relate to each other.69 It can also be said that the problem with 
imported Western law is that it may ‘clash’ with the society of the country in question, 
given that law does not exist in isolation of ‘history, culture, human and material re-
sources, religious and ethnic composition, demographics, knowledge, economic condi-
tions, politics [etc]’.70 However, it is clear that this would not convince someone who 
supports importing a foreign legal model if this model has precisely the aim to change 
the society in question. 
Thus, third, the more substantive counter-argument is that economic develop-
ment should not be the main aim. Some of the critical literature is fairly ‘political’, re-
jecting the ‘capitalist’ focus on privatisation, property rights and ease of doing business 
and the corresponding disregard of resource preservation and social rights.71 But there 
are also more refined positions. A good example is the work by Amartya Sen, the win-
ner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1998. His suggestion is that 
of ‘development as freedom’, meaning that the main aim should be to enable everyone 
‘to be able to do and be’.72 This requires elementary ‘capabilities’, not simply income 
and wealth, but, for example, education, social security, personal liberties, equal oppor-
tunities and fairness. A recent report, co-authored by Sen,73 also refers to subjective 
well-being as a possible measure of social progress, reflecting the growing field of 
‘happiness studies’. 
It follows that learning is not limited to one model. For example, if one assumes 
that common law countries have an advantage in economic development, this does not 
necessarily mean that this model is the superior one. Civil law countries may well per-
form better if one uses measures of low poverty rates (or perhaps ‘happiness’) as de-
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pendent variables.74 It is also said that learning should not be asymmetrical. In particu-
lar, it should also include ‘reverse learning’ by Western legal systems from other parts 
of the world.75 
Another plausible response may be that legal rules should reflect both economic 
and non-economic aims. Such an approach seems to be taken by international organisa-
tions such as the UN, for example, in the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and in 
the Millennium Declaration.76 However, it is also clear that not all aims are mutually 
reconcilable. This will also be apparent in the research discussed in the next section. 
 
5.2 Welfare Models and Varieties of Capitalism 
 
In the same way as comparative law classifies countries into legal families, other com-
parative social sciences have developed classifications which include topics that have a 
legal dimension. Often, these classifications are also seen as test cases concerning the 
preferability of the respective models. The following discusses two of these, partly 
overlapping, contemporary classifications that originate from research in comparative 
politics, political economy and social policy.77 
The first is the distinction between ‘three worlds of welfare capitalism’ by Gøsta 
Esping-Andersen.78 These forms of capitalism are based on a variety of substantive 
policies such as pensions, sickness and unemployment benefits, and lead to a distinction 
between the liberal welfare systems of Anglo-Saxon countries, a conservative-
corporatist category of most continental European countries, and the social-democratic 
Scandinavian countries. Subsequently, it has been argued that Mediterranean countries 
                                                 
74
 Sachs, J (2008) Common Wealth: Economics for a Crowded Planet Penguin at 258. 
75
 De Sousa Santos, B and Rodriguez-Garavito, CA (2005) ‘Law, Politics, and the Subaltern in 
Counter-Hegemonic Globalization’ in de Sousa Santos, B and Rodriguez-Garavito, CA (eds) 
Law and Globalization from Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality Cambridge University 
Press, 1; Nelken (2007), supra n 68, 35; Hantrais supra n 54 at 15 (for social sciences more gen-
erally). 
76
 See http://www.undp.org/ and 
http://www.un.org/en/development/devagenda/millennium.shtml. 
77
 For further discussion and examples see Siems supra n 1 at 257-301. 
78
 Esping-Andersen, G (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism Princeton University 
Press. 
 22 
such as France and Spain deserve a separate category.79 Also, if one adds countries of 
the developing world, further groups may be necessary, such as regimes of ‘informal 
security’ and ‘insecurity’.80 
The second main classification derives from the ‘varieties of capitalism’ litera-
ture. According to Peter Hall and David Soskice81 the main distinction is between lib-
eral market economies such as the UK and the US on the one hand and coordinated (or 
organised) market economies such as Germany and Japan on the other. A typical feature 
of the former countries is the use of competitive markets, whereas the latter rely more 
on collaborative relationships. Within the group of coordinated market economies Hall 
and Soskice distinguish between countries with industry-based and group-based coordi-
nation. Others suggest further categories, for example, a category of governed market 
economies, such as today’s China,82 or three categories for the northern, western and 
southern countries of continental Europe.83 
The concept of ‘institutional complementarities’ plays an important role in un-
derstanding the varieties of capitalism. It suggests that the differences between these 
groups extend to many institutional features. For example, being a coordinated market 
economy is seen as related to strong employment protection, support of incremental in-
novation, sectoral training schemes, coalition governments and high levels of social 
welfare.84 It is also thought that the varieties of capitalism distinction can explain con-
ceptual differences in many areas of law,85 as well as differences between common and 
                                                 
79
 Eg Castles, FG (2004) The Future of the Welfare State Oxford University Press 26. 
80
 Suggested by Wood, G and Gough, I (2006) ‘A Comparative Welfare Regime Approach to 
Global Social Policy’ (34) World Development 1696.  
81
 Hall, PA and Soskice, D (2001) ‘An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism’ in Hall and 
Soskice supra n 34, 1. 
82
 See Weiss, L (2010) ‘The State in the Economy: Neoliberal or Neoactivist?’ in Morgan, G; 
Campbell, JL; Croch, C; Pedersen OK and Whitley, R (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Com-
parative Institutional Analysis, Oxford University Press 183 at 184. 
83
 Amable, B (2003) The Diversity of Modern Capitalism Oxford University Press (Scandina-
vian welfare state, Rhine capitalism and Mediterranean model, in addition to the market-based 
Anglo-Saxon model and the meso-corporatist model of Asia). 
84
 Hall and Soskice supra n 81 at 17, 19, 39, 50. See also Hall, PA and Gingerich, DW (2009) 
‘Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities in the Political Economy: An Em-
pirical Analysis’ (39) British Journal of Political Science 449. 
85
 Kennedy, D (2012) ‘Political ideology and comparative law’ in Bussani, M and Mattei, U 
(eds) Cambridge Companion to Comparative Law Cambridge University Press 35 at 46-8 (on 
corporate law, labour law, welfare law, civil procedure); Casper, S (2001) ‘The Legal Frame-
 23 
civil law countries.86 Specifically, Katharina Pistor and Curtis Milhaupt refer to differ-
ences in the degree of centralisation of law-making and enforcement, expecting more 
centralisation in civil than in common law countries. However, using case studies of 
individual countries they also show that regulatory responses to financial crises may 
depart from these different starting points.87 
The question remains whether identifying differences in capitalism — including 
their connections to other legal and non-legal themes — may lead one country to decide 
that it wants to follow the ‘better’ model of another country. Here a first consideration 
could be that, according to the political science literature, such a policy transplant does 
not work if countries are ideologically and psychologically incompatible.88 Yet, re-
searchers have also examined how changes occur, for example, how models of the wel-
fare state have diffused within Europe,89 how distinctions between welfare states have 
weakened (or strengthened) in recent times,90 and how dynamic elements can be incor-
porated into an understanding of varieties of capitalism.91 
Thus, returning to a distinction made earlier in this article,92 on the one hand it is 
possible that a jurisdiction deliberately wants to change its law in order to shift in its 
approach to welfare and capitalism. On the other hand, it is possible that the society has 
already changed. For example, it is conceivable that changes in corporate ownership 
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structures shift a country closer to one or the other variant of capitalism: then, if the 
law-maker wants to follow, it may be advantageous to transplant the legal rules of a 
country where these changes have already occurred. 
 
5.3 Forms of Government and Constitutional Design 
 
Research which tries to classify forms of government goes back to Aristotle, who ana-
lysed the constitutions of Greek towns based on the number of rulers and the quality of 
governments, leading to three ‘good’ types (monarchy, aristocracy, polity) and three 
‘corrupt’ ones (tyranny, oligarchy, democracy). Today, a well-known dataset derives 
from the Polity IV Project which provides world-wide information on political regimes, 
distinguishing between full democracy, democracy, open anocracy, closed anocracy, 
and autocracy.93 Recently, another project has also established a dataset on varieties of 
democracy.94 
In the past, the question about the ‘best’ form of government has often led to the 
response that it all depends on the country in question. For example, in the 18th century 
Montesquieu famously suggested that constitutional structures should reflect the cli-
mate, geography, culture and character of a nation.95 Today’s research is less ‘relativist’. 
The use of quantitative data has led to the consensus view that there is a positive corre-
lation between the level of democracy on the one hand and economic growth, security 
and safety on the other — though it is highly controversial whether this means that eco-
nomic development stimulates democracy, or vice versa.96 
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Current research has also refined the analysis. On the one hand, this concerns the 
need to examine different shades of democratic and non-democratic regimes. For in-
stance, it is sometimes suggested that a ‘benevolent autocracy’ may be less problematic 
than a weak democracy.97 On the other hand, research on ‘constitutional engineering’98 
has tried to establish what impact specific choices have on the aims law-makers want to 
pursue. Take the following examples:99 it is suggested that the extent to which a country 
is a ‘consensus democracy’ is associated with less violence and more extensive social 
welfare,100 that parliamentarism is more conducive to stability and development than 
presidentialism,101 and that proportional representation leads to larger government 
spending and more frequent political compromise than more majoritarian voting sys-
tems.102 Studies have also looked at differences in the involvement of stakeholders in 
the law-making process, and how those may relate to laws favouring group interests.103 
For law-makers such research may show that they may be able to design consti-
tutional rules in order to achieve particular aims. To be sure, here too, it needs to be 
considered that those general regularities will not work in every political and socio-
economic context. But, sometimes, it is possible that this ‘merely’ leads to a shift in the 
meaning of the rules. It can be observed that constitutions follow quite different aims: in 
the West it is primarily a legal document, in transition economies it may be more of an 
aspirational one, in countries with internal or external tensions it may aim to unite the 
country and strengthen the state, and in some developing countries it may mainly be 
used to please possible donor countries.104 Thus, a country that adopts a constitutional 
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rule of another country may well be aware that its operation will be different, but still 
see it as a useful model to follow. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION: BEYOND ACADEMIC SILOS 
 
This article has taken the view that ‘implicit comparative law’ research can provide use-
ful suggestions on how to improve legal rules and institutions. ‘Implicit comparative 
law’ (ICL) was defined as research from non-law disciplines which compares and eval-
uates legal differences. Mainstream comparative law largely ignores such research. As 
far as such research is considered, it is also frequently dismissed. For example, some of 
the quantitative work is just seen as too simplistic and insensitive towards the complex-
ity of legal rules and the respect for foreign legal cultures. 
However, such criticism may also be criticised for being insensitive towards the 
paradigms, methods and tools of other academic disciplines. It is understandable that a 
researcher may face something of a culture shock when she reads papers from other dis-
ciplines that do not follow the line of reasoning she has taken for granted. In particular, 
this is the case when, say, a legal scholar reacts to the bold statements made by econo-
mists, perhaps overlooking that these are just models constructed under certain assump-
tions or just hypotheses proposed to be tested. To be sure, it is not suggested that only 
legal scholars are at fault. In particular, some of the comparative work conducted by 
economists105 would have benefitted from closer interaction with legal scholars.  
All of this means that cooperation across disciplines should be strengthened.106 
Researchers need to reach beyond their ‘academic silos’ in order to gain a fuller under-
standing of the world. It is suggested that this is particularly true in comparative law and 
in particular for the issue of ‘better law’. Comparative law is closely related to other 
comparative disciplines, such as comparative politics, sociology and economics, since 
these latter disciplines are often crucial for the understanding of similarities and differ-
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ences between legal systems.107 In order to evaluate law it is also crucial to consider the 
non-legal context of the law. Moreover, as this article has aimed to show, such non-law 
comparative disciplines have the advantage that they are less hesitant than legal research 
in making legal and policy recommendations based on cross-country comparisons. This 
does not mean that these recommendations always get it right. But they also show that 
comparative law is clearly too important to be solely left to comparative lawyers. 
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